China & Water Control
To understand water power, you must first understand scale. Then you must understand leverage. Water is not environmental theatre — it is strategic input control.
Sydney Harbour holds approximately 500 gigalitres of water (commonly cited estimate).
Oil can be substituted, rerouted, hedged, and replaced over time. Water cannot. No water means no agriculture, no industrial continuity, no population stability — and no political legitimacy.
If you control the water, you control the timelines, the pressure points, and the negotiation space.
China has pursued upstream water infrastructure at scale. It is the largest dam-builder on earth — and it is not close.
Dams are not just infrastructure. They are leverage.
The Mekong supports tens of millions downstream. Upstream control creates leverage over agricultural timing, food pressure, and political influence.
- Control upstream timing → control downstream planting cycles
- Control seasonal release → influence food supply and pricing pressure
- Control volatility → create uncertainty that weakens downstream governments
Water leverage is not loud. It is structural.
The Murray–Darling shows what happens when governance lags hydrology: allocation failure, political conflict, and instability — without a foreign adversary.
- Allocation failure becomes a political flashpoint
- Stakeholder conflict slows decisions
- The system becomes reactive rather than strategic
That is with no external actor deliberately positioning for leverage.
It should be abundantly clear: China has deliberately positioned itself to secure control over critical water systems — domestically and regionally — as long-term statecraft.
Strategic ground is lost quietly — with delay, complacency, and a failure to recognise momentum while it is still reversible.
If Australia asserted sovereign control over water tomorrow, the consequences would be immediate: pricing disruption, diplomatic pressure, and capital consequences.
This is why water cannot be treated as a commodity line-item. It is strategic input control — and strategic input control becomes bargaining power.
Western governments must always ask:
Why does China want these assets — and what strategic value do they see that we don’t?
What are they paying? What is the long-term gain?
Scorecard: Australia 0 — China 100